This paper deals with the problem of secure data transmission based on multi-input multi-output delayed chaotic systems. A new multi-input secure data transmission scheme is proposed. Moreover, in order to increase again the robustness of secure data transmission, delays are introduced as a second firewall against known plain-text attack. With this method, the parameters used as secret keys of the system are not identifiable and, as a result, the proposed scheme is robust to known plain-text attacks.
Introduction
Over the past decade, synchronization of chaotic systems and its potential application to secure communications have received a lot of attention since Pecora and Carrol proposed a method to synchronize two identical chaotic systems (Pecora et al., 1990) . Many chaos-based secure data transmission systems have been proposed, which can be roughly classified at least into the following categories: chaotic masking (Kovarev et al., 1992) , chaotic masking with delays (Lee et al., 2003) , chaotic switching , chaotic modulation (Wu et al., 1993) and inverse system approach (Feldmann et al., 1996) ....
Since the work (Nijmeijer et al., 1997) , synchronization can be viewed as a special case of observer design problem, i.e the state reconstruction from measurements of an output variable under the assumption that the system structure and parameters are known. For a synchronization chaos-based cryptosystem, a receiver (an observer from a control theory point of view) is designed in order to synchronize the transmitter (a chaotic system with unknown inputs from a control theory point of view) and to reconstruct the confidential messages (the unknown inputs of the chaotic system from a control theory point of view). Many techniques arising from observation theory have been applied to the problem of synchronization: observers with linearizable dynamics (Huijberts et al., 2001) , adaptive (Fradkov et al., 2000) or sliding mode observers (Boutat et al., 2001 ), generalized hamiltonian form based observers (H. Sira Ramirez and C. Cruz Hernandez, 2001 ), etc ...
It is known that some of the designed secure data transmission systems based on chaos with single input have been broken (Pérez et al., 1995) , (Short, 1994) , (Yang et al., 1998) , (Anstett et al., 2006) . Particularly, it has been recently shown in (Anstett et al., 2006) that traditional methods of data transmission by synchronization of chaotic systems suffer from the serious drawback of not being robust with respect to known plain-text attacks. More precisely, according to the famous Kerkhoff assumption (Kerkhoff, 1883) , it is assumed that hackers know all the details about the cryptosystem but the secret key. It is known that, for the chaos-based cryptosystem, the keys are usually the chaotic system parameters. So from a control theory point of view, the possibility to reconstruct the keys for chaos-based cryptosystem is equivalent to the possibility to identify the parameters of the chaotic system (Huijberts et al., 1997) . Consequently, a robust and reliable chaos-based cryptosystem should be designed such that its parameters are not identifiable.
Although chaotic synchronization using systems with a single input has been widely investigated in the last decade, it is not the case for the multi-input case. One of the main reasons is the possibility, for systems with several inputs, to use multiplexing techniques before ciphering the messages. Thus, the problem becomes similar to a single input one. Nevertheless, although multiplexing techniques appear to be a very convenient and economical means, the main drawback of this kind of scheme is that all the messages have the same risk to be broken.
In this paper, solutions are provided to improve the secure data transmission based on chaotic synchronization. First, a real multi-input secure data transmission is proposed. In this scheme, the inputs are not composed in order to obtain only one input which 'drives' the chaotic system but the totality of the inputs drive the chaotic system and only the outputs are multiplexed. This approach decreases the risk of known plain-text attacks, because the probability to know all plain-texts at the same time is less than to know only one message. Moreover, the multi-input scheme has the advantage to allow different priorities of secure data transmission. For example, every user can access to one input while only the administrator of the group can access to other inputs. Inspired by the above consideration, a new scheme is derived as follows: for the transmitter system, the composition is used to combine the outputs, instead of combining the inputs directly. This approach relies on the problem of designing an observer for chaotic system (Nijmeijer et al., 1997) but with unknown inputs. Actually, the problem of recovering the message is a left invertibility problem (Hirschorn R.M., 1979; Singh S.N., 1982; Respondek W., 1990) . This scheme can also be seen as a version for multi-input multi-output systems of the traditional inverse system approach proposed in (Feldmann et al., 1996) . Fig. 1 illustrates the scheme of the considered approach. According to this scheme, the inputs can not always be recovered simultaneously, i.e., even if the message M N 1 in Fig. 1 , for example, has been broken, the other ones still remain unbroken. Note that the users can be divided into several groups according to different requirements or emergent levels. In that case, different groups (M N 1 , M N 2 ,..., M N m in Fig.  1 ) have different degrees of security. Even if it reduces the risk of the messages to be broken, it will be shown that this multi-input approach is not robust enough against an attack to known plain-texts if all the inputs are known at the same time. Indeed, in that case, the parameters used as secret keys are still identifiable. To solve this problem, we propose to introduce delays (that will also be considered as a part of the secret keys) in the outputs of the systems. As a result, the parameters are not identifiable anymore and classical attacks are inefficient.
The outline of the paper is as follows. The next section is devoted to the analysis of the observability and the identifiability of multi-input multi-output systems without delays. A left inversion algorithm for systems with unknown inputs, that was introduced in (Barbot et al., 2005) , is recalled. Then, cryptanalysis and identifiability problems are discussed in Section 3 and, in Section 4, a new scheme is given to design a multiple secure data transmission system with delays based on a given chaotic system, in which the risk for the keys to be broken by known plain-text attacks can be reduced. In Section 5, an example based on Qi's chaotic system (Qi et al., 2005) illustrates the proposed method.
A left invertibility algorithm for systems without delays
In this section, the left invertibility algorithm given in (Barbot et al., 2005) is recalled.
Consider first a chaotic system without delays in the following general form:
x ∈ U is the state vector, U is an open set of n , and f : n → n is analytic. The aim is to establish a multiple secure data transmission system which can be described by the following form:
where k ∈ q is the key vector, y ∈ p is the output vector and
T ∈ m represents the confidential information to be transmitted. The vector fields
T are assumed to be sufficiently smooth on U , where
Without loss of generality, it is assumed that, for all x ∈ U , the distribution span {g 1 , . . . , g m } and the codistribution span {dh 1 , . . . , dh p } are nonsingular. It is also assumed that p ≥ m. Let us define the following sets that will be used in the sequel:
• The vector relative degree ρ of the system (2) is defined by
where
• Φ is the codistribution spanned by the time derivatives of the measured outputs not affected by the inputs:
• Ω is a basis of Φ:
£ is the commutative algebra linked to Ω:
• G is the smallest involutive distribution that contains {g
• G ⊥ is the annihilator of G, i.e.
where the α i are one-forms such that for all λ ∈ G, l λ α i = 0 for i = 1 : n − k, where l λ α = α(λ) is the inner product of the vector field λ and α.
Using the set Ω, one can define a transformation (ξ, η) = φ(x) such that the system (2) is locally transformed into the following normal form:
Using classical observation algorithms, the unknown input u can be obtained (and thus the left invertibility problem can be solved) under some restrictive conditions: one should have r = n or the distribution span {g 1 , . . . , g m } should be involutive. In order to increase the complexity of the unknown message recovery, it is proposed here to set the unknown input channel such that r < n and such that span {g 1 , . . . , g m } is not involutive. In (Barbot et al., 2005) , the authors described an observation algorithm that solves the left invertibility problem for such systems. It is briefly recalled here. The main idea of this algorithm is to find extra information through functions of the outputs and their time derivatives. Let us define:
that can be known using the normal form (4). Assume there exists a 1×p vector function
and define a dummy output as follows:
If dȳ / ∈ Ω £ , it can be considered as a suitable fictitious output in order to estimate more states. The system has a new vector relative degreer = n with respect to the original outputs and the fictitious outputȳ. Ifr = n, it has been shown in [Barbot, et al., 2005] that both the state x and the unknown inputs u can be estimated in finite time.
The following proposition gives some equivalent conditions that guarantee the existence of a solution to Equation (6) and thus, the existence of a proper dummy output.
Proposition 1 (Barbot et al., 2005) The following conditions are equivalent: i) Equation (6) has a non trivial solution K and dȳ / ∈ Ω £ . ii) the set of equivalence classes E =
The dummy outputsȳ are only function of the previously known outputs and their time derivatives. If the system is left invertible, the algorithm derived in (Barbot et al., 2005) provides an expression of all the states and the unknown inputs as functions of the original outputs y, their time derivatives and the key vector 1 :
Then, the states and the unknown inputs can be reconstructed in finite time via for instance sliding mode observers (see (Floquet and Barbot, 2006) ). Consequently, for this scheme, the security of the transmission is partially based on the difficulty to find all the dummy outputsȳ. But, when allȳ are formally known it is possible to derive equations (7). Then, the main question is whether or not it is possible from (7) to identify the key k. This point is discussed in the next section.
Cryptanalysis and identifiability
Equation (7), and consequently the proposed scheme, can not resist to known plain-texts attack when all plain-texts are known at the same time. Indeed, consider the second equation of (7) at different instants t 1 , ..., t l . It is possible to obtain independent equations with respect to k:
Then, two cases appear:
• there exist q = l independent equations, which is equivalent to:
∂Ψ(y(tq),ẏ(tq),...,y
From the implicit function theorem it is obvious that all parameters are identifiable. Consequently, such a data transmission scheme is not robust against known plain-text attacks.
• l < q, which means that q − l parameters are not identifiable and can not play the role of the key. Thus, the knowledge of these parameters is not necessary for recovering the message and those parameters are of no interest in the transmitter design.
The question is how to obtain an input-output relation equation, sensitive to parameters, but that should be not identifiable even if all the inputs are known. To solve this problem, it is proposed here to introduce delays (that are also a part of the unknown parameters) in the secure data transmission system. Assume for instance that at least one delay appears in (7). Then, (8) becomes:
with j ≤ n − 1. From (9), it can be seen that there are more unknown inputs, y (s) (t z − τ ) and k, than the number of independent equations. Consequently, the introduction of the delay operator into the input-output relation equation exhibits a robust characteristics with respect to known plain-text attacks. In the following section, the robustness of the previously proposed scheme is improved by the introduction of delays.
4 Secure data transmission scheme based on systems with delays
Consider the system (2) with delays:
where the l delays are also a part of the secret key. Let us show that the algorithm given in (Barbot et al., 2005) still allows to solve the left invertibility problem and thus to recover the messages u i .
Since the delays only appear in the g i vector fields, it is always possible to transform such system in the form (4) with delays:
Then Equation (5) becomes
Assume it is possible to find
Then, in a similar way to the case without delays, it is possible to recover the message u in finite time.
As a way of illustration, an example is given in the next section in order to illustrate all the key points of the proposed method. A sliding mode observer that provides the knowledge of the confidential information in finite time is also designed.
Illustrative example
Let us construct a multiple secure data transmission system based on Qi's Chaotic System in (Qi et al., 2005) , which is described as follows:
where x i (i = 1, ..., 4) are the state variables, and a, b, c, d are all positive real constant parameters. Consider the following transmitter which is based on the chaotic system (13):
where e is a positive real constant, τ is the introduced delay and, for sake of notation simplicity, x i stands for x i (t).
It is assumed that m 1 and m 2 are small, that 0 < m 2 < β and that the following condition is satisfied:
The outputs are set as y = x 1 x 2 T . The input channel vector fields g 1 and g 2 have been chosen such that the strong relative degree of the system is r = 3. So, following the lines of the algorithm proposed in (Barbot et al., 2005) , calculate
Thus, one can choose
such that KΓ = 0. Since K is not a function of the delayed output, it is possible to use again the algorithm proposed in (Barbot et al., 2005) . One has
Then, the following dummy output can be defined as:
and dȳ / ∈ Ω £ . Thus, item i) of Proposition 1 is satisfied. Then, let us set
T .
With this new output y, the dimension of the set
is equal to 4. This means that one can recover all the state in finite time.
A straightforward consequence of the fact that span{g 1 , g 2 } is regular, is the possibility to reconstruct the unknown messages also in finite time. For this, let us design a sliding mode observer as follows: 
and with the auxiliary states:
Observability bifurcations can also introduced in order to improve the robustness of the transmission scheme. Here, the submanifold of observability singularity is given by
In order to overcome the singularity, one can use the same method as in (Barbot et al., 2003) .
The following quantities will be used to reconstruct the messages:
where 0 otherwise
The observation errors are defined by:
From system (14), it can be computed that: 
Thus, the dynamics of the observation error is given by:
The convergence of the sliding mode observer relies on a step-by-step procedure.
First step: one has:ė
and
Second step: for t > t 1 , using (22) and (23), the e 1 dynamics becomes:
Thus, if λ 1 > sup ∀t>0 |m 1 |, there exists t 2 , such that, for t > t 2 > t 1 , e 1 = e 1 = 0. Then:
The relation (19) provides a finite time estimation of m 1 .
Third step: for t > t 2 , using (22) and (24), one has:
If λ 3 is chosen such that 
Suppose that S 1 is the correct solution. From (21), the confidential message can be recovered correctly as follows:
In this case, one has for S 2 :
Using (26) and (27), one has: 
Conclusion
In this article, a new multiple secure data transmission system based on multiinput multi-output chaotic delayed systems was proposed. The multi-input multi-output scheme allows to reduce the risk for the messages to be broken because it is more difficult to know all the unknown inputs at the same time. Some delays were also introduced in order to improve the robustness of the secure data transmission with respect to known plain-text attacks.
